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ABSTRACT
What would happen if the Federal Reserve were to change the assets in its portfolio?
Suppose that instead of using open-market operations in Treasury securities to increase
the monetary base, the Fed were to engage in open-market operations in private securities
or to use discount loans via a mechanism that allowed banks to borrow as much as they
would like at a fixed discount rate.  The analysis in this paper shows the impact on the
economy in a static general-equilibrium model.  A SHORT-TERM MODEL OF THE FED’S PORTFOLIO CHOICE
What would happen if the Federal Reserve were to change the assets in its portfolio?
Suppose that instead of using open-market operations in Treasury securities to increase the
monetary base, the Fed were to engage in open-market operations in private securities or to use
discount loans via a mechanism that allowed banks to borrow as much as they would like at a
fixed discount rate.  The analysis in this paper shows the impact on the economy in a static
general-equilibrium model. 
This model follows Santomero (1983), adapted to evaluate a change in the Fed’s portfolio
and how that affects the economy’s general equilibrium at a point in time.  The nature of the
exercise done here is completely static in nature and does not evaluate the economy’s response to
a disappearance of government debt, analysis of which would require a more complete model
that’s dynamic in nature and incorporates real effects.  The present model focuses on the more
narrow issue of the direction of portfolio changes with no real-side economic effects.  But the
model is general equilibrium in nature and thus performs a reasonable comparative-static
exercise.
In what follows, we first describe the model in Section I.  Next, we model a situation in
which the Fed changes its portfolio in such a way as to keep the interest rate on deposits from
changing (Section II).  Section III generates results under a special set of assumptions that lock
most interest rates together.  Section IV attempts to generalize the results to a situation in which
the monetary base is unchanged.  Section V summarizes the results.2
I.  The Model Framework
There are 5 agents in the model, banks (b), the Fed (f), the Treasury (t), households (h),
and firms (m).  There are 5 financial instruments in the model:  (1) deposits at banks (D); (2)
high-powered money (H), in the form of currency (C) and reserves (R); (3) government bonds
(G); (4) private bonds (V) [you can think of private bonds held by households as corporate debt
and private bonds held by banks as corporate loans]; and (5) discount window loans (W). 
Figure 1 shows the balance sheets of the agents.  Note that all financial instruments are
liabilities of at least one agent and assets of at least one agent, and the total amount of assets held
by all agents must equal the total amount of liabilities for each instrument.
Notation in this model follows the convention of Santomero, using lower-case
abbreviations for agents and upper-case for instruments. For instrument I, the demand by agent j
will be denoted 
d
j I ; for example, the demand for government bonds by banks is 
d
b G .  A
superscript s denotes supply.  We’ll also assume there’s only one of each agent to keep things
simple.  The net worth of each agent i is NWi.
Following Santomero, the budget constraints (from the balance sheets in Figure 1) are:
Bank:  
ddd s d
bb b bb b R GV DW N W 
Fed: 
dd s s
ff f f f GVW H N W  
Household: 
dddd
hhh h h D CGV N W 
Firm: 
s
mm K VN W  (K is firm’s capital.)
Treasury: 
ds
tt t D GN W 3




ht b D DD  interest rate is  D r
High-powered money: 
dd s
bh f R CH  interest rate is 0
Government bonds: 
ddd s
bfht GGGG  interest rate is  G r
Private bonds: 
ddds
bfhm VVVV  interest rate is  V r
Discount window loans: 
ds
bf WW  interest rate is  W r
Equilibrium comes about by changes in interest rates and quantities of assets.  It’s a
short-run model, so we aren’t worried about bigger issues.  Imagine an equilibrium and we’ll
look at some comparative-static exercises.  Since we won’t be allowing income or wealth to
change in these experiments, we won’t include those in the model.
The Fed can increase the amount of high-powered money either by increasing the amount
of non-borrowed reserves via open-market operations (buying either government bonds or
private bonds in the open market) and via discount window loans (lending directly to banks).
Note that we’re taking an aggregate view, thus not modeling the interbank (fed funds) market; so
any shortage of reserves that banks want must be met by changes in interest rates to reduce the
demand for reserves.
Now for each of the demand and supply terms in the model, we need to find how they are
related to the various interest rates (and other factors that won’t change in this short-run model). 4
Bank:
Demand for reserves:  
ds
bb R D     so reserve requirements are binding and no excess
reserves are held.
Demand for government bonds:  (,,, )
              +     
dd
bb G V D W GG r r r r 

 — where the signs indicate the
partial response of the variable to an increase in the argument above.  Here the
demand for government bonds by banks rises when the interest rate on
government bonds rises (higher own return), but falls when the interest rate on
private bonds rises (banks buy more private bonds and fewer government bonds)
or when the bank must pay higher interest rates on deposits or discount loans
(since then the cost of funds is higher, so the bank wants a smaller portfolio).
Demand for private bonds:  (,,, )
                 +   
dd
bb G V D W VV r r r r 
 
-- similar to the case of government
bonds.
Supply of deposits:  (,,, )
               +  +    +
ss
bb G V D W D Drrrr 

-- when returns to bank assets rise, the bank
will want more deposits; when the interest rate on deposits rises it will want fewer
deposits; when the interest rate on discount loans rises, it will want more deposits
to replace discount loans, if it has any outstanding.
Demand for discount loans:  (,,, )
               +  +   +   
dd
bb G V D W WW r r r r 

-- same factors as supply of deposits,
but with opposite effects due to changes in rate on deposits or discount rate.  5
Fed:
We take Fed actions to be exogenous; given some equilibrium, we’re going to see what
happens in a comparative-static sense when the Fed changes its assets and liabilities,
assuming monetary policy targets an interest rate, as discussed below.  
Household:
Households substitute between deposits, currency, government bonds, and private bonds,
depending on the relative returns to each.  A higher own return increases demand, while a
higher return on an alternative assets decreases demand.  So the demands for each are:
Demand for deposits:  (,,)
                   +
dd
hh G V D D Drrr 

Demand for currency:  (,,)
                  
dd
hh G V D CC r r r 

Demand for government bonds:  (,,)
              +   
dd
hh G V D GG r r r 

Demand for private bonds:  (,,)
                + 
dd
hh G V D VV r r r 

Firm:
For now, we take capital and the amount of private bonds issued as exogenous.  If we
consider more complicated issues, such as the issuance by government-sponsored
enterprises of additional bonds when their relative returns decline, this assumption must
be changed.  But for now, 
s
m V  is taken to be exogenous.
Treasury:
We assume that Treasury issuance of government bonds, 
s
t G , is exogenous.  An earlier
version of this model assumed that any change in bond issues must be offset by an equal6
change in deposits, 
d
t D .  But that’s not really appropriate.  The decline in government
debt occurs because the government has essentially received a surprise increase in net
wealth (i.e., tax receipts and unexpectedly higher and expenditures unexpectedly lower
than they were before).  However, this fact must be reflected in real economic activity
(i.e., households or firms must have higher capital or net wealth than before) as well,
analysis of which is going to require a more complete model of real activity.  Thus, it
makes sense at this point to simply do a differential analysis on the Fed’s portfolio.
In this version, in order to examine just the differential effect from the Fed’s portfolio
decision, we’ll take the supply of government bonds as exogenous.
Equilibrium:
We assume that an equilibrium exists in which all the equations describing demand and
supply are determined, all the budget constraints are satisfied, and there’s a unique equilibrium in
the return variables, rD, rG , rV , and rW.
Monetary Policy:
Consider the following comparative statics experiment:  The Fed reduces its holding of
government bonds by the amount  0.
d
f dG    What happens in equilibrium depends on what
else the Fed does to its portfolio.  
We assume for now that, in the short run, monetary policy targets the interest rate on
deposits, so  0. D dr    Thus, any changes that occur to rD are offset by the Fed to return the
interest rate to its initial level.  Why is it this interest rate that’s targeted?  Since we aren’t7
modeling banks individually or complicating the model by introducing uncertainty about within-
maintenance-period shocks, we don’t model a federal funds market explicitly.  Instead, thinking
of the usual supply and demand diagram for reserves, which is consistent with our model, since
reserve demand depends only on deposit demand, we assume the Fed targets the interest rate on
deposits in the short run. How can the Fed hit its interest-rate target?  Consider two possible
methods by which this happens:
(1) The Fed does open-market operations in private bonds to hit its interest-rate
target.  
(2) The Fed substitutes a new discount loan mechanism by which discount loans
substitute for government bonds on the Fed’s balance sheet and are supplied to
banks elastically at the interest rate rW .
The Discount Window:  To keep things simple, we assume that case (1) involves mechanisms in
place today, and that the discount window is prohibitively expensive for banks.  Thus there is no
discount window borrowing.  In case (2), we assume the Fed has in place a simple discount
window mechanism allowing banks to borrow all they want at the discount rate (the NACF, non-
administered credit facility).
Spell it out in the model:
Now, let’s think about what goes on in each market:
Deposits:  (,,) (,,, )
          +                      +  +    +
dd s
h GV D t bGV DW D rrr D Drrrr 
 
An increase in the return to government or private bonds decreases household
demand for deposits and increases bank supply of deposits, so excess demand for
deposits decreases.  A higher interest rate on deposits increases household8
demand for deposits and decreases the bank’s supply of deposits, so the excess
demand for deposits rises.  An increase in Treasury deposits increases excess
demand.  Thus, we can summarize the deposit market with the excess demand
function (ignoring the effect of changes in the discount rate):
(,,, ,)0
        +    +  
d















The demand for high-powered money is split into two parts: currency demand by
households and reserve demand by banks.  The Fed operates by affecting the
supply of high-powered money, thus influencing interest rates. In the market for
high-powered money, the excess demand is given by:
(,,,, )0
      ?  ?    +   
s
GV DW f Hr r r r H 

.
Note that higher returns to government or private bonds lead banks to earn a
higher return on their assets, so they want to attract more deposits, so they
demand more reserves, hence more high-powered money, but households demand
less currency and deposits, hence less high-powered money; so the signs of the
first two arguments are ambiguous.  Higher deposit interest rates lead banks to
offer fewer deposits, so they need fewer reserves, and households want to hold
less currency, so the demand for high-powered money is lower.  And, of course,
when the Fed supplies more reserves, excess demand for reserves declines.9
Government bonds: (,,,) (,,)
       +                          +   
dd d s
bG VD W f hG VD t Grrrr G Grrr G  
 
  Higher returns to government bonds will increase the demand by both banks and
households for the bonds.  Higher returns to private bonds will have the opposite
effect.  When the return to deposits rises, households and banks want to hold
fewer government bonds.  Thus the excess demand for government bonds is:
(,,, , , )0
     +       +     
ds
GV D f t W Gr r r G G r 
  
Private bonds: (,,, ) (,,)
        +                          +   
dd d s
b G VD W f h G VD m Vrr rr V Vrr r V  
  
Higher returns to private bonds will increase the demand by both banks and
households for the bonds.  Higher returns to government bonds will have the
opposite effect.  When the return to deposits rises, households and banks want to
hold fewer private bonds.  Thus the excess demand for private bonds is:
(,,, , , )0
       +     +    
ds
GV D f mW Vr r r V V r 
  
.
What we have is really a system of 4 excess demand equations [D=0, H=0, G=0, and
V=0] in 3 endogenous variables [rD, rG , and rV ].  But if three of the excess demands are zero,
the fourth must also be zero because budget constraints hold (Walras’s Law).  That means one
excess demand equation is redundant. 10
Solving:
In all three cases, the Fed’s reduction in demand for government debt is modeled as:
0
d
f dG   .
This change in the Fed’s balance sheet is offset by a Fed action to keep the interest rate on
deposits unchanged:
(1)  Open-market operations in private securities:
ds
ff dV dH     
or (2) Discount window loans:
s s
ff dW dH     
Method:  In both cases, we’ll totally differentiate the excess demand equations and see if we can
solve for a deterministic equilibrium. 










GVD f t W
d
GVD f W
Ddr D dr D dr D dD D dr
G dr G dr G dr G dG G dG G dr




Note that the excess demand functions are affected one-for-one by changes in supply or demand,
so D4 = 1, G4 = 1, G5 = –1, and V4 = 1.11
II.  Fed Portfolio Shift with No Change in Interest Rate on Deposits
In this section, we model the results when the Fed’s portfolio shifts in such a way that the
deposit interest rate is unchanged.
Case 1:  Open-Market Operations in Private Securities
0
d
f dG   ,  , 
ds
ff dV dH     , such that drD = 0.


















Use the first equation to find drG in terms of drV, then use that in the second equation to solve for
drV.  Use that in the third equation to solve for , to see which direction monetary policy goes.  
Results of derivations:
11 2 2 1 /( ) 0 V dr D DG D G    
21 2 2 1 /( ) 0 G dr D DG D G   
21 12 1 2 2 1 () / ( ) 0 DV DV DG DG     
12 2 21 1
12 21






The sign of    is unclear, since it depends on the relative size of different effects.
Thus we don’t know if high-powered money increases or decreases.  But we do know that the
Fed buys private bonds and sells government bonds; we just don’t know which quantity is larger.
Overall effects:  The remaining effects can be found from the direction of change of  G dr  and
V dr , and the agents’ budget constraints.  Since  G r  and  V r  move in opposite directions, some
things can’t be signed.12
Deposits:   ?,   ?
ds
hb dD dD , 0 D dr 
High-powered money:   ?,   ?,   ?
dd s
bh f dR dC dH
Government  bonds: >0, <0, >0, 
ddd
bfh dG dG dG 0 G dr 
Private  bonds: <0, >0, <0
ddd
bfh dV dV dV , 0 V dr 
Case 2:  Discount Window Loan—NACF
In this case, the Fed opens the discount window and lets banks borrow all they want at the
discount rate, with no administrative costs.  Monetary policy is conducted by changing the
discount rate as the Fed changes its portfolio.  Discount window loans and high-powered money




f dG   ,  W dr   , such that drD = 0.  Let  .
s s
ff dW dH     
Because there’s one more market now (discount window loans), the system grows by an order of
magnitude.  
The excess demand function for discount loans is:
(,;; ;)0
    +   +  +     
s
GV D f W Wr r r W r 
















Gd r Gd r G
Vdr Vdr V









Solve the first 3 equations simultaneously to find  , drG, and drV, then use those in the fourth
equation to solve for 
s
f dW . 
Results of derivations:
15 2 5 5 2 () , G Xd r D DV DV   
where 
2
12 5 1 5 6 1 5 2 1 1 2 1 5 6 2 2 5 () () ( ) X DD GV GV D GV GV DD GV GV    
If we assume that  12 21 , GV GV   then  1 0, X   so  0. G dr 



















The term  V dr  can’t be signed, so we don’t know if the return to private bonds will rise or fall.
125
5
12 5 5 2 25 1 1 5 52 1 1 2
1
         [ ( ) ( ) ( )],
s
fG V dW Wdr W dr W
D





   
which is positive if the main effect is from the  5 W  term.
Other effects:
1.  If  0: V dr 
Deposits:  <0, <0
ds
hb dD dD , 0 D dr 
High-powered money:  <0,  <0,  <0
dd s
bh f dR dC dH
Government  bonds: >0, <0, >0, 
ddd
bfh dG dG dG 0 G dr 
Private bonds:  >0,   <0
dd
bh dV dV  
Discount loans:   0,  0
sd
fb W dW dW dr  14
2. If  0: V dr 
Deposits:  ?, ?
ds
hb dD dD , 0 D dr 
High-powered money:  ?,  ?,  ?
dd s
bh f dR dC dH
Government  bonds: >0, <0, >0, 
ddd
bfh dG dG dG 0 G dr 
Private bonds:  >0,   <0
dd
bh dV dV  
Discount loans:  0,  0
sd
fb W dW dW dr  
3. If  0: V dr 
Deposits:  <0, <0
ds
hb dD dD , 0 D dr 
High-powered money:  <0,  <0,  <0
dd s
bh f dR dC dH
Government bonds:  >0 (probably),  <0,  >0 (probably), 
dd d
bf h dG dG dG 0 G dr 
Private bonds:  ?,   ?
dd
bh dV dV  
Discount loans:   0
sd
fb dW dW   (probably),  0 W dr 
 15
III.  Special Assumptions Locking Interest Rates Together 
Under one scenario under consideration, the returns to most assets are locked together.  That
scenario involves a situation in which banks view discount loans and deposits as perfect
substitutes, so  WD rr  .  Banks are willing to loan as much as firms desire to borrow from them at
a constant spread, so  . DV rm r    Given these assumptions, all our solution methods are changed
somewhat, because now quantities supplied and demanded, rather than interest rates, will change
to achieve equilibrium.  Letting  WD rr r  , the analysis can be restructured so that demands and
supplies depend just on  G r  and r, with some demands or supplies adjusting completely, when
there are perfect substitutes.  
Deposits: (, )
        +
dd s




t D is exogenous and 
s
b D is endogenous but banks
supply all the deposit accounts that are opened at a given deposit rate.
High-powered money:
dd s
bh f R CH 
so [ ( ,) ] ( ,)
            +                      
dd d s
hG t hG f D rr D Crr H   
 
.
Government bonds: (, )
                        +
ddd s
bfh G t GGG r rG  

.
Private bonds: (, )
                      
ddd s




b V is determined passively such that the
return on deposits plus a constant equals the return on private bonds.
Discount loans:
ds
bf WW  , where 
d
b W  adjusts passively such that  WD rr  .
Included in the special assumptions are that  0
d
b G  .16
Case 1a:  OMO in Private Securities
With the special assumptions in place, when the Fed reduces its demand for government bonds
and increases its demand for private bonds, doing so in a way that leaves the interest rate on
private bonds unchanged (because  0 VD dr dr  ), the following results are obtained:
The changes in the budget constraints of the agents are:
Bank:
dds
bb b dR dV dD 
Fed:
dd s
ff f dG dV dH 
Household: 0
dddd
hhhh dD dC dG dV 
Results:
Government bonds:  ( , ) 0
dd
hG f dG r r dG 
Since 0, 0,  so  0.
dd
fh G dG dG dr     
Since  0, 0, 0, 0.
ddd
Ghhh dr dD dC dV 
Deposits:   0, so  0.
ds d
hb b dD dD dR  
High-powered money:  Since  0 and  0, then  0.
dd s
bh f dR dC dH  
Private bonds:  From the bank’s budget constraint, since reserves decline less than
deposits, banks must hold fewer private bonds, so  0.
d
b dV    Thus the bank’s portfolio
shrinks.
Additional Restrictions:
Under another set of assumptions considered, demand by households for currency and
deposits is exogenous.  Imposing those conditions here would mean that
0 and  0.
sd d
ff f dH dV dG   17
Case 2a:  Discount Window Loans—NACF
The experiment is one in which the Fed reduces its holdings of government bonds, with
an NACF in place, and the Fed supplies however many advances banks want at a fixed discount
rate, which in this case equals r.  
The changes in the budget constraints of the agents are:
Bank:
dds d
bb b b dR dV dD dW 
Fed:
dss
ff f dG dW dH 
Household: 0
dddd
hhhh dD dC dG dV 
Results:
Government bonds:  ( , ) 0
dd
hG f dG r r dG 
Since 0, 0,  so  0.
dd
fh G dG dG dr     
Since  0, 0, 0, 0.
ddd
Ghhh dr dD dC dV 
Deposits:   0, so  0.
ds d
hb b dD dD dR  
High-powered money:  Since  0 and  0, then  0.
dd s
bh f dR dC dH  
Private bonds:   0,
dd
bh dV dV   so  0.
d
b dV 
In this situation, the banking system expands.
Discount loans:  Assuming the direct effect from the Fed’s reduction in demand for
government bonds exceeds the impact on the monetary base (a very likely event), then
0.
sd
fb dW dW 1819
Additional Restrictions:
Under another set of assumptions, demand by households currency and deposits is
exogenous.  Imposing those conditions here would mean that
0 and  0.
ss d
ff f dH dW dG   20
IV.  Generalizing the Problem with an Unchanged Monetary Base
Suppose we now wish to get rid of the restriction that  0 D dr  .  This makes the problem
much more difficult to solve algebraically, because now there’s one more term to solve for.
However, we then use a new assumption about Fed policy, which puts another restriction on the
system—either we assume the Fed does not allow the monetary base to change, or we assume
that the discount rate doesn’t change.  We consider 3 new cases, related to the 2 previous cases:
Case 1b:  Private bonds case:
0
d
f dG   ,  , 
ds
ff dV dH      = 0.
In this case, the Fed demands fewer government bonds and replaces them with private
bonds, with no change in the monetary base and no discount window in operation.
Case 2b:  Discount window—NACF case:
0
d
f dG   ,  , 0, 
ss
fW f dW dr dH      . 
Case 2c:  Discount window—ACF case (ACF = auction credit facility):
0
d
f dG   ,  , 0
ss
ff dW dH      .21
Case 1b: Private bonds case:
0
d
f dG   ,  , 0, 
ds
fW f dV dr dH       = 0.
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12 3 3 2 23 1 1 3 31 2 2 1
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() ( ) ()
G
DG V DG V
dr




The sign of this is hard to figure out, because the terms point in opposite directions.  The






), while  2 G






).  The denominator is much more complicated, consisting of six third-order
terms.  Of these 6, 5 are negative and 1 is positive.  However, the one term that’s positive is the








), so this may be larger in value then all the other cross
effects, in which case the denominator is positive.  This type of assumption is one that we often
make in comparative statics exercises using graphical analysis.  But we should be careful
because those cross partials here must also reflect budget constraints, so judging their magnitude
can be difficult.  Nonetheless, if these assumptions hold, then  0 G dr  .
Other results:
31 1 13 3
12 3 3 2 23 1 1 3 31 2 2 1
[( ) ( ) ]
() ( ) ()
V
DG V DG V
dr




If we make the same assumptions that we made above, and if we further assume that  11 GV 
and that  31 3 1 1 3 3 () D GD V D G V   , which again may be reasonable if the own effects are much
larger in magnitude than the cross effects, then  0 V dr  .  This is intuitive since the demand for
private bonds is increasing.
12 2 21 1
12 3 3 2 23 1 1 3 31 2 2 1
[( ) ( ) ]
() ( ) ()
D
DG V DG V
dr




Unfortunately, there’s no intuition on the sign of the change in the interest rate on deposits.
Different effects point in different directions, and the sign depends on relative magnitudes.
Banks substitute some government bonds for some private bonds, given the direction of change
of returns, but it’s impossible to tell whether banks’ assets overall increase or decline, since we
can’t tell if deposits increase or decrease.23
 Case 2b:  Discount window—NACF case:
0
d
f dG   ,  , 0, 
ss
fW f dW dr dH      . 

























12 3 3 2 23 1 1 3 31 2 2 1
()








Compared to case 1b above, finding signs is a bit easier.  The numerator is probably positive,
which occurs if  32 23 DVD V  .  Again, this would occur if the own effects are bigger than cross
effects. The denominator is the same as in case 1b, so under the same assumptions, then  0 G dr  .
31 13
12 3 3 2 23 1 1 3 31 2 2 1
()









12 3 3 2 23 1 1 3 31 2 2 1
()








Both  V dr  and  D dr  are positive, under the assumptions made above.  People’s demand for deposit
accounts could rise or fall, depending on how they respond in comparing the higher yield on
government bonds and private bonds to the higher yield on deposits.
12 3 3 2 23 1 1 3 31 2 2 1
12 3 3 2 23 1 1 3 31 2 2 1
[( ) ( ) ( ) ]
() ( ) ()
D VW VW D VW VW D VW VW






This term is most likely positive, though not definitively (5 of the 6 terms in the numerator have
the same sign).  But to know whether the monetary base rises or falls, we need to know whether
   is positive or negative, which is impossible to tell.24
With returns on government bonds, private bonds, and deposits all rising, people will hold less
currency.  But we don’t know if the monetary base rises or falls.  If it rises, then given that
there’s less currency held, there must be more reserves held against more deposits.  In that case,
the banking system must get bigger.  But if the monetary base declines, which happens if
deposits decline sufficiently, then we wouldn’t be able to tell if the banking system’s assets
would increase or decrease.25
Case 2c:  Discount window—ACF case:
0
d
f dG   ,  , 0
ss
ff dW dH      .
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This is quite a complicated system.  If we assume that the own effects dominate, as we did
earlier, then it suggests that both numerator and denominator are negative, so  0 G dr  .
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This is clearly not signable, and there are no own effects, so it’s impossible to sign  V dr .26
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Again, there are no own effects in the numerator, so it can’t be signed.  
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Here, there’s an own effect, and if it dominates the other terms, then  0 W dr  .
All the results here are quite tentative, for they depend on somewhat dubious assumptions.
Whether the banking system expands or contracts here is hard to say.  We know that the banking
system takes out more discount loans, equal to the decrease in the demand for government bonds
by the Fed.  But do those discount loans displace more or fewer deposits?  Since funding is
becoming more expensive, banks may wish to reduce the size of their portfolio; on the other
hand, returns are higher, so they may wish to expand.  Households may substitute government
bonds for deposit accounts, as well.  27
V.  SUMMARY
This paper develops a static general-equilibrium model of the Fed’s portfolio choice in
the short run.   Finding the results of a Fed portfolio shift requires a number of assumptions,
which may not hold in all cases.  The results reported below make use of those assumptions.
When the Fed changes its portfolio by reducing its ownership of government bonds and
keeps the interest rate on deposits from changing, the results depend on what the Fed substitutes
to replace government bonds.  If the Fed buys private securities, the interest rate on such
securities decline while the interest rate on government bonds rises.  If the Fed uses a non-
administered credit facility (NACF), the interest rate on government bonds rises and the discount
rate falls.
When the Fed changes its portfolio by reducing its ownership of government bonds and
interest rates are locked together, the results also depend on what the Fed substitutes to replace
government bonds.  If the Fed buys private securities, the interest rate on government bonds rises
and banks hold fewer private bonds and banks shrink in size.  If the Fed uses an NACF, the
interest rate on government bonds rises and the banking system expands. 
When the Fed changes its portfolio by reducing its ownership of government bonds but
does not fix the deposit rate and interest rates are not locked together, we find the following
results.  If the Fed buys private bonds and does not allow the monetary base to change, then the
interest rate on private bonds declines while the interest rate on government bonds rises.  If the
Fed uses an NACF and does not allow the discount rate to change, then the interest rates on
government bonds, private bonds, and deposits all rise and the demand for currency declines.  If
the Fed uses an auction credit facility (ACF) and does not allow the monetary base to change,
then the interest rates on government bonds and private bonds rise. 28
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